The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy by Beaney, Michae
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Beaney, M. (2013). The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy. In M. Beaney (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the
History of Analytic Philosophy (pp. 30–60). (Oxford Handbooks). Oxford University Press.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
In Michael Beaney, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013, pp. 30–60 
Chapter 2 
The Historiography of Analytic Philosophy 
Michael Beaney 
 
If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so only out of the fullest exertion 
of the vigour of the present. (Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life’, 1874, p. 94) 
The past alone is truly real: the present is but a painful, struggling birth into the 
immutable being of what is no longer. Only the dead exist fully. (Russell, ‘On History’, 
1904c, p. 61) 
History begins only when memory’s dust has settled. (Ryle, ‘Introduction’ to The 
Revolution in Philosophy, 1956, p. 1) 
 
Nietzsche opens his brilliant early essay ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life’ with a quote from Goethe: “In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me 
without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity.” He goes on to argue that we need 
history “for the sake of life and action”, and this forms a central theme throughout his 
subsequent work. We find it expressed again, for example, in On the Genealogy of Morals, 
where he attacks modern historiography for aspiring merely to mirror and hence resisting 
any kind of judgement (1887, ‘Third Essay’, §26). In his early essay, Nietzsche 
distinguishes three species of history, which he calls ‘monumental’, ‘antiquarian’, and 
‘critical’, corresponding to three ways in which history relates to the living person: “as a 
being who acts and strives, as a being who preserves and reveres, as a being who suffers 
and seeks deliverance” (1874, p. 67). Monumental history provides a supply of the greatest 
moments in history for emulation and inspiration; antiquarian history gives a sense of the 
local coherence and rootedness of previous life and thought to satisfy our nostalgia for their 
imagined certainties; while critical history submits the events of the past to the tribunal of 
reason for examination and critique. Nietzsche argues that all three types of history are 
needed, each correcting the excesses of the other. Antiquarian history reminds monumental 
history of the terrain that makes possible the mountain peaks, for example, while 
monumental history rectifies the myopia of antiquarian history. Critical history encourages 
 The historiography of analytic philosophy 2 
us to tackle the mountain peaks for ourselves, while foiling the epistemological escapism 
of antiquarian history. 
The historiography of analytic philosophy provides excellent illustrations of 
Nietzsche’s three species of history. Standard textbooks tend to represent analytic 
philosophy as a progression from one mountain peak to another, from Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift through Russell’s theory of descriptions to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, to 
name but three familiar summits. There are detailed works of scholarship that offer 
antiquarian powder to explode monumental mythology, such as Griffin’s book on Russell’s 
break with idealism (1991) and Uebel’s account of the Vienna Circle debate about protocol 
sentences (1992, 2007). As to critical history, this has been alive and kicking from the very 
dawn of analytic philosophy, from Frege’s criticisms of the views of his predecessors in 
the first half of The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), Russell’s reconstruction of Leibniz’s 
philosophy (1900), and Moore’s simplification of idealist arguments (1899a, 1903b), 
onwards.1 Kripke’s use of Frege and Russell as the stalking-horses for his own theory of 
reference (1980) and his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following to 
motivate his idea of a ‘sceptical solution’ to a ‘sceptical paradox’ (1982) are just two more 
recent examples to illustrate the power and prevalence of the genre. 
However, it would be misleading to suggest that any of these examples involve 
only one of Nietzsche’s three species of history. Rather, each combines different aspects 
of those species in varying degrees. Dummett’s first book on Frege’s philosophy of 
language (1973), for example, might be seen as combining the monumentalizing of Frege 
with critical reconstruction to further his own concern with developing a theory of 
meaning. Candlish’s recent book on the dispute between Russell and Bradley (2007) does 
not just provide a much-needed corrective to received views of this dispute but has its own 
underlying agenda – to argue for a view of philosophy that does justice to its historical 
dimension. Nietzsche’s tripartite distinction, though, offers a useful initial typology to 
indicate the range of accounts of the history of analytic philosophy and of analytic 
                                                
1 I discuss the role of what I call ‘historical elucidation’ in Frege’s Foundations in Beaney 2006a, and the 
significance of Russell’s ‘rational reconstruction’ of Leibniz in Beaney 2013a. For an account of Moore’s 
‘refutation’ of idealism, see Baldwin 1990, ch. 1. 
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approaches to history, and a fruitful framework to explore some of the historiographical 
issues that arise from these accounts and approaches. 
 
2.1 Context and connection 
Nietzsche’s essay was written in 1874, which was a significant year in the development of 
modern philosophy.2 Lotze’s so-called ‘greater’ Logic was published, an expanded version 
of his 1843 ‘lesser’ Logic. Whether or not Lotze counts as a neo-Kantian himself, he 
undoubtedly had a major influence on both neo-Kantianism and analytic philosophy as it 
originated in its two main – German and British – branches.3 This was especially true of 
his anti-psychologism and the Kantian distinction he drew between psychological genesis 
and logical justification.4 A new edition of Hume’s Treatise was also published, to which 
the British idealist Green wrote long introductions attacking what he called ‘the popular 
philosophy’, a form of empiricism with roots in Locke’s Essay and confusions that became 
clear in Hume’s Treatise, according to Green. Green’s Cambridge contemporary and 
sparring partner, Sidgwick, also published his main work, The Methods of Ethics, in 1874. 
While Sidgwick may be far less well known today than Mill, he developed a more 
sophisticated form of utilitarianism which had a major influence on Moore and many 
subsequent ethical theorists such as Hare, Parfit, and Singer.5 
                                                
2 See the chronology of analytic philosophy and its historiography that follows this chapter. 
3 Defining ‘neo-Kantianism’ has proved controversial. In its narrowest sense, it covers the philosophy of the 
so-called Marburg and Southwest Schools, originating in the work of Hermann Cohen and Wilhelm 
Windelband, respectively, dating from the early 1870s. More broadly, it also covers earlier philosophers 
writing after Kant, who in some way concerned themselves with Kant’s philosophy, such as Kuno Fischer, 
Hermann Lotze, and Otto Liebmann (who originated the ‘Back to Kant’ slogan in 1865), as well as other 
philosophers not directly associated with the two main schools such as Hans Vaihinger and, more 
controversially, Wilhelm Dilthey. Gabriel (2002) suggests that Lotze is the founder of neo-Kantianism; while 
Anderson (2005) distinguishes between ‘orthodox’ and ‘non-orthodox’ neo-Kantianism, the former 
corresponding to the narrower sense just identified. In his helpful account of the relationship between neo-
Kantianism and anti-psychologism, Anderson defines orthodox neo-Kantianism precisely by its commitment 
to anti-psychologism, in emphasizing both the objectivity and the normativity of logical and philosophical 
principles. The concern with normativity is an important feature, according to Anderson, and rules out as 
orthodox neo-Kantians others such as Frege and Husserl who also stressed the objectivity of logic (2005, pp. 
291, 305–6). On the nature of neo-Kantianism, cf. also Köhnke 1986; Adair-Toteff 2003; Makkreel and Luft 
2010. 
4 On Lotze’s influence on Frege, see Gabriel’s chapter in this Handbook. On the importance of the distinction 
between psychological genesis and logical justification in analytic philosophy, see Beaney 2013a. 
5 See Schultz 2011. 
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Lotze was the dominant philosopher in Germany at the time, and both Green and 
Sidgwick were leading figures in British philosophy. Green became White’s Professor of 
Moral Philosophy at Oxford in 1878 (although unfortunately he died just four years later), 
and Sidgwick became Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge in 1883. 
In 1874, though, there were two further significant publications by philosophers who, like, 
Nietzsche, were at the beginning of their careers: Brentano and Bradley. Brentano was the 
oldest of the three, and in 1874 he published his first major work, Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint, in which he sought to establish a new science of mental phenomena, 
thereby sowing the seed of the phenomenological tradition that came to fruition in the work 
of Husserl. Bradley had been taught by Green, and he was to succeed Green as the main 
representative of British idealism. Bradley’s first publication appeared in 1874, too, 
offering an interesting comparison with Nietzsche’s essay. Entitled ‘The Presuppositions 
of Critical History’, it discusses a conception of ‘critical history’ close to Nietzsche’s. 
History, for Bradley, involves a ‘union’ of ‘the past in fact’ with ‘the present in record’ 
(1874, p. 8), and he rejects empiricist accounts that assume that past facts can simply be 
read off from present records. Instead, those records need to be subjected to interpretation 
and critical judgement. This idea was to influence Collingwood’s later insistence on the 
need to interrogate sources.6 Whereas Nietzsche offers, essentially, a pragmatic rationale 
for critical history, namely, that it invigorates our current thinking, Bradley digs deeper 
and argues that history inevitably involves interpretation and criticism. The main themes 
of his idealist metaphysics are already visible in this early work.7 
1874 also saw two important publications by mathematicians. Both give little 
indication in their title of their revolutionary implications. One is called ‘On a Property of 
the Set of Real Algebraic Numbers’. In this paper Cantor first showed that the class of real 
numbers is not countable, thereby inaugurating his theory of transfinite numbers, which 
led – via the development of set theory – to the emergence of the paradoxes that are central 
to the story of early analytic philosophy.8 The second is called ‘Methods of Calculation 
based on an Extension of the Concept of Magnitude’, and was Frege’s Habilitationsschrift, 
                                                
6 See especially Collingwood 1946/1993. On the development of Collingwood’s views on historiography, 
see Wilson 2001. 
7 For further discussion of this work, see Walsh 1984. 
8 See Tappenden’s chapter in this Handbook. 
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written to qualify him to teach back at Jena, where he had first gone to university and where 
he was to stay for the rest of his career. Still five years before his Begriffsschrift of 1879, 
which is what truly revolutionized logic, this earlier work nevertheless anticipates the main 
idea of his logicist project. The seed from which the whole of arithmetic grows, he argues, 
is addition, which he associates with the iteration of an operation, represented by an 
appropriate function. So the concept of a function holds the key to connecting the different 
areas of arithmetic (1874, pp. 57-8). 
The other significant publication of 1874, which – together with Lotze’s Logic – 
marks the emergence of a debate that is central to the story of analytic philosophy right 
from the beginning, is Wilhelm Wundt’s Principles of Physiological Psychology. 
Described as “the most important book in the history of modern psychology” (Boring 1950, 
p. 322), Wundt here lays the foundations of empirical psychology by arguing that 
‘consciousness’, or ‘inner experience’ as he defines it, can be investigated scientifically by 
direct self-observation. Wundt rejected Kantian criticisms of the scientific status of 
psychology, and five years later, he established Germany’s – and Europe’s – first 
psychology laboratory. (The very first in the world was founded just a year after Wundt’s 
Principles, in 1875, by William James at Harvard.) With Lotze leading the Kantian 
opposition, the battle-lines were thus drawn up in the debate about psychologism that raged 
well into the twentieth century, as both analytic philosophy and phenomenology sought to 
establish themselves in opposition to psychologizing tendencies in philosophy and, on the 
other hand, empirical psychology broke away from philosophy to launch itself as a separate 
discipline. Indeed, although the debate has sometimes gone quiet, as in the 1920s and 
1930s, it has never really left the philosophical agenda, and arguments about the 
relationship between philosophy and psychology were reinvigorated by the naturalistic 
forms of analytic philosophy that developed after the Second World War.9 
In one year, 1874, then, we have works published which either represent or herald 
most of the great traditions of late nineteenth- and twentieth century Western philosophy: 
                                                
9 For an account of the debates about psychologism, especially around the turn of the twentieth century, see 
Kusch 1995, 2011; cf. Travis 2006b. On the relationship between philosophy and psychology, see also Reed 
1994; Hatfield 2002, 2012. On the development of naturalistic forms of analytic philosophy of mind, see 
Crawford’s chapter in this Handbook. 
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neo-Kantianism, idealism, utilitarianism, phenomenology, scientific philosophy, as well as 
analytic philosophy – or at any rate, that branch of analytic philosophy that had its roots in 
work on the foundations of mathematics. Perhaps all we are missing are works representing 
positivism and pragmatism. Mach’s Analysis of Sensations was not to be published until 
1886, although positivism counts as a form of scientific philosophy and Mach was both 
influenced by and made contributions to empirical (or physiological) psychology. The term 
‘pragmatism’ did not make its public appearance until 1898, although Peirce’s essays of 
1877–8 are often taken to mark the emergence of pragmatism and we might, in any case, 
see pragmatist ideas in Nietzsche’s philosophy.10 As far as the history of analytic 
philosophy is concerned, this reminds us that the analytic tradition did not emerge in an 
intellectual vacuum, or in a space informed only by certain mathematical developments 
and local hostility to British idealism.11 On the contrary, in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, there was both intense debate about existing philosophical positions, such as 
empiricism, idealism, Kantianism, and psychologism, and germination of the seeds of the 
new traditions of the twentieth century, including phenomenology and pragmatism as well 
as analytic philosophy itself. Any proper understanding of the development of analytic 
philosophy, then, has to take account of its place in the broader intellectual context and its 
changing and contested interconnections with other traditions and disciplines.12 
 
2.2 Analytic philosophy and ahistoricism 
As the two essays by Nietzsche and Bradley indicate, there was much discussion about the 
nature and role of historical understanding in the second half of the nineteenth century – in 
the period in which analytic philosophy itself has its origins. As is well known, however, 
                                                
10 Hookway (2008) and Bernstein (2010) do not mention Nietzsche at all in their accounts of pragmatism. 
But Rorty (1998) does count Nietzsche as a fellow pragmatist, citing Berthelot 1911 as the first work in which 
Nietzsche is classified with James and Dewey and where Nietzsche is first called a ‘German pragmatist’. Cf. 
also Rorty 1991, p. 2. 
11 One of the aims of the detailed chronology that follows this chapter is to provide further reminders of the 
richness not only of the analytic tradition itself but also of the broader scientific and philosophical context in 
which analytic philosophy developed. 
12 On aspects of the background to analytic philosophy, see the chapters by Gabriel, Skorupski, Tappenden, 
and Hyder in this Handbook, and on the relationship of analytic philosophy to British idealism, pragmatism, 
and phenomenology, see the chapters by Griffin, Misak, and Smith, respectively. For substantial accounts of 
British idealism, American pragmatism, and phenomenology, see Mander 2011, Misak 2013, and Moran 
2000, respectively. 
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analytic philosophy emerged with an entirely ahistorical self-image. Indeed, it might be 
said that its official ideology was strongly anti-historical. In one of his great purple 
passages, Frege has this to say about historical investigations in the introduction to The 
Foundations of Arithmetic: 
 
The historical mode of investigation, which seeks to trace the development of things from 
which to understand their nature, is certainly legitimate; but it also has its limitations. If 
everything were in continual flux and nothing remained fixed and eternal, then knowledge 
of the world would cease to be possible and everything would be thrown into confusion. We 
imagine, it seems, that concepts originate in the individual mind like leaves on a tree, and we 
suppose that their nature can be understood by investigating their origin and seeking to 
explain them psychologically through the working of the human mind. But this conception 
makes everything subjective, and taken to its logical conclusion, abolishes truth. What is 
called the history of concepts is really either a history of our knowledge of concepts or of the 
meanings of words. Often it is only through enormous intellectual work, which can last for 
hundreds of years, that knowledge of a concept in its purity is achieved, by peeling off the 
alien clothing that conceals it from the mind’s eye. (1884, p. VII/1997, p. 88) 
 
Frege took himself to have revealed the ‘pure’ concept of a natural number, by 
defining the natural numbers as extensions of logical concepts. To show that this was 
indeed the right account, however, he had to explain what was wrong with previous 
conceptions of number, and he does this in the first half of the Foundations, discussing the 
views of Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Mill, among others. To a certain 
extent, then, Frege himself does history of philosophy. It may only be ‘critical history’ of 
a fairly simple kind, but it is important nevertheless in motivating his own views. I have 
called this ‘historical elucidation’, alluding to Frege’s use of ‘elucidation’ (‘Erläuterung’) 
to refer to that pre-theoretical work that must be undertaken to get the basic (indefinable) 
concepts understood.13 Although Frege does not talk of elucidation having an historical 
dimension, his work shows that it does. New views always need to be positioned in the 
historical space of past conceptions, as Frege realized after it was clear from the reviews 
                                                
13 See Beaney 2006a. For Frege’s use, see Frege 1899 [1980], pp. 36–7 (where Frege talks of 
‘Erläuterungssätze’ – ‘elucidatory propositions’); 1906 [1967], pp. 288–9 (in Frege 1984, pp. 300–01, 
‘Erläuterung’ is mistranslated as ‘explication’); 1914 [1997], pp. 313–4 (in Frege 1979, pp. 207–8, 
‘Erläuterung’ is mistranslated as ‘illustrative example’). For further discussion of elucidation, see e.g. Weiner 
1990, ch. 6; 2001; 2005; Conant 2002; Reck 2005; 2007. 
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of Begriffsschrift that no one had appreciated his achievement or project.14 He recognized 
that an informal account of the kind offered in the Foundations was a necessary preliminary 
to the formal demonstration of his logicism that he later sought to carry out in the Basic 
Laws.15 
Russell’s and Moore’s contribution to the founding of analytic philosophy 
proceeded quite explicitly by critical engagement with the views of previous thinkers. Their 
rebellion against British idealism is the most familiar part of the story.16 Less well known 
is the significance of the book Russell published in 1900: A Critical Exposition of the 
Philosophy of Leibniz.17 This can justifiably be regarded as the first work of ‘analytic’ 
history of philosophy, heralding what later came to be known as ‘rational reconstruction’.18 
What is interesting about this book is that it was written before Russell’s conversion to the 
new quantificational logic of Frege and Peano.19 This is not to say that it was composed 
while Russell was still under the influence of British idealism, however. It was written in 
the short transitional period in which Russell was rebelling against British idealism – and 
indeed, played a key role in that rebellion. As Russell himself later remarked (1959a, p. 
48), what he realized in working on Leibniz was the importance of the question of relations, 
and he was led to reject what he called ‘the doctrine of internal relations’ – that “Every 
relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms”, as he put it (1959, p. 43). He saw 
this doctrine as characteristic of both British idealism (and Bradley’s monism, in particular) 
                                                
14 Frege was prompted, in particular, to read and criticize Boole’s work; see May and Heck’s chapter in this 
Handbook. 
15 His three seminal papers of 1891–2 can also be seen as essentially elucidatory papers, though here there is 
less historical positioning. 
16 See Griffin’s chapter in this Handbook. 
17 One of the few commentators to recognize its significance is Hunter (1993). 
18 For a fuller account of this, see Beaney 2013a. 
19 Russell first met Peano in August 1900, an event that Russell described as “a turning point in my intellectual 
life” (1975, p. 147). His book on Leibniz was published in October, but he had finished writing it in March 
and had received the proofs in June. Only the preface was written after this turning point, in the same month 
– September 1900 – as he first started extending Peano’s calculus to the logic of relations. (Cf. the chronology 
in Russell 1993, pp. liii–liv.) Russell called this month “the highest point of my life” (1975, p. 148): a month 
that included both his recognition of the revolutionary power of the new logic and his presentation to the 
world of the first rational reconstruction in analytic history of philosophy. 
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and Leibniz’s monadism. His rejection of British idealism was thus partly effected through 
his critique of Leibniz.20 
 What a commentator must do, Russell writes, “is to attempt a reconstruction of the 
system which Leibniz should have written—to discover what is the beginning, and what 
the end, of his chains of reasoning, to exhibit the interconnections of his various opinions” 
(1900, p. 2). In reconstructing Leibniz’s philosophy, Russell identifies five main premises 
that he argues generate not only Leibniz’s characteristic doctrines but also the 
inconsistencies that affect his philosophy. Exposition thus goes hand-in-hand with 
criticism, according to Russell. Indeed, the two are virtually inseparable, since the views 
need to be set out as clearly as possible to make judgements about them, and being alert to 
inconsistencies means respecting all the passages where claims are asserted or denied (cf. 
1900, p. 3). 
Russell’s conception of history of philosophy is further clarified in the preface to 
the book, where he distinguishes a “mainly historical” from a “mainly philosophical” 
approach. The first is concerned with influences, causes, context, and comparisons, while 
the second aims to discover “the great types of possible philosophies”, the understanding 
of which enables us to “acquire knowledge of important philosophic truths” (1900, pp. xv–
xvi). On this second approach, Russell writes, “the philosopher is no longer explained 
psychologically: he is examined as the advocate of what he holds to be a body of 
philosophic truth. By what process of development he came to this opinion, though in itself 
an important and interesting question, is logically irrelevant to the inquiry how far the 
opinion itself is correct” (1900, p. xvi). Like Frege and the neo-Kantians, then, Russell 
draws a sharp distinction between psychological genesis and logical justification, which 
underlies his distinction between the two approaches to history of philosophy and his own 
obvious preference for the “mainly philosophical” approach. 
 Both Russell’s distinction and preference have been characteristic of analytic 
historiography throughout the history of analytic philosophy, at any rate until fairly 
recently. Indeed, as the cases of Frege and Russell suggest, this analytic conception of 
                                                
20 Russell’s concern with Leibniz, however, was accidental. He was asked to give a course of lectures on 
Leibniz in Cambridge in Lent Term 1899, in place of McTaggart, who was away at the time. Cf. Russell 
1975, p. 136, 1993, p. 511. 
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history of philosophy is both historically and logically prior to the systematic projects 
pursued by analytic philosophers. Following Frege and Russell, analytic philosophers have 
offered (or borrowed) rational reconstructions in criticizing previous philosophical 
doctrines to motivate their own philosophical views, and presupposed the validity of the 
distinction between psychological genesis and logical justification in their methodology. 
On Frege’s and Russell’s view, then, the history of philosophy is just a repository 
of different philosophical positions, understood as eternally given and towards which 
different philosophers take different attitudes.21 The adoption of these attitudes may be 
explained either psychologically or logically, and the task of the ‘philosopher’ (as opposed 
to ‘historian’) is to sift out the logical reasons from the psychological causes in arguing for 
the correctness of their own philosophical position and incorrectness of all other positions. 
That this view itself emerges out of a particular intellectual context (late nineteenth-century 
anti-psychologism) is obscured by the very anti-psychologism it presupposes. It might also 
account for why Frege and (early) Russell did not see themselves as offering a ‘new 
philosophy’. The forms of realism they adopted (Platonism in the case of Frege, naïve 
realism in the case of Russell in his initial rebellion against British idealism) were hardly 
new positions – but more importantly, could not be seen as new by the approach to history 
of philosophy they adopted. What was new was their methodology, based on logical 
analysis and contextual definition.22 
 Alternative conceptions of history of philosophy were available to Frege and 
Russell at the time they were writing. One such alternative was presented to Russell by 
Cassirer in his review of Russell’s book on Leibniz.23 Cassirer appreciates the value of 
Russell’s “systematic interest”, which enables questions to be asked that are rarely raised 
in traditional accounts (1902, p. 533). But he criticizes Russell for his obsession with 
identifying contradictions. Conflicting views might well be found in Leibniz’s writings 
when taken as a whole, but the conflict may simply be the result of intellectual development 
or of different dialectical contexts, where different pressures or concerns are involved. 
                                                
21 On this conception, cf. Rée 1978. 
22 See the previous chapter in this Handbook. 
23 The review occurs in an appendix to Cassirer’s own book on Leibniz (1902, pp. 532–41). Another review 
was by the Leibniz scholar and translator Robert Latta (1901). Both reviews are briefly discussed in Hunter 
1993, pp. 407–9. 
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Cassirer’s main example is Leibniz’s conception of substance, which in reworking the 
traditional Aristotelian conception by giving it a dynamic character, looked both backwards 
and forwards. Cassirer writes that “It would be entirely one-sided and unhistorical to judge 
this opposition, on which, as it were, the whole inner tension of the system rests, as simply 
a contradiction” (1902, p. 539). According to Cassirer, there may be ‘tensions’ in 
philosophical systems, but this is what drives philosophical thinking, the proper 
understanding of which requires a synthesis of ‘historical’ and ‘philosophical’ approaches. 
We will come back to this in due course. 
 
2.3 Russell’s role in the construction of analytic philosophy 
As the cases of Frege and (early) Russell suggest, then, a philosopher’s general position 
shapes, and in turn is shaped by, their view of history of philosophy. Analytic philosophers 
ever since have tended to endorse critical history: past philosophical work is selected and 
rationally reconstructed for present purposes, providing both alternative views by means 
of which to situate one’s own view as well as ideas and arguments, judged to be good, upon 
which to build. In this second case, but even to an extent in the first case, this leads to a 
certain degree of monumentalizing, whereby key figures or doctrines are singled out for 
approval. Despite criticizing Kant’s conception of arithmetic, for example, Frege still 
referred to him as “a genius to whom we can only look up with grateful admiration”, and 
suggested that he was merely refining Kant’s notion of analyticity in pursuing his logicist 
project (cf. 1884, §§ 88-9/1997, pp. 122-3). 
 Russell engaged in a great deal of critical history throughout his life. As well as 
writing on past philosophers such as Leibniz and Kant, he also discussed the work of many 
of his contemporaries, including James, Bradley, Frege, Meinong, Poincaré, Bergson, 
Dewey, Broad, Ryle, and Strawson, to name just some of the most prominent.24 All this 
engagement can be seen as culminating in his History of Western Philosophy, published in 
1945. Its subtitle reveals that there is an element of antiquarianism here, too, though: “and 
its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the 
                                                
24 For the range of Russell’s writings on other philosophers, see the various volumes of his Collected Papers. 
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Present Day”. The book is an unreliable guide to either the philosophers or the 
circumstances covered, but the brief final chapter makes clear Russell’s own position and 
also the critical function that his antiquarianism performs. Entitled ‘The Philosophy of 
Logical Analysis’, Russell argues that one of the main attractions of the philosophy he 
endorses is that it does not allow itself to be influenced by “mistaken moral considerations” 
or “religious dogmas”. “In the welter of conflicting fanaticisms”, Russell writes, “one of 
the few unifying forces is scientific truthfulness, by which I mean the habit of basing our 
beliefs upon observations and inferences as impersonal, and as much divested of local and 
temperamental bias, as is possible for human beings” (1945/1961, p. 789). The 
antiquarianism thus turns out to be employed in criticizing the philosophies Russell rejects. 
The scientific truthfulness of which Russell here speaks is a further reflection of 
that distinction between logical justification and psychological (or social or political) 
explanation that lies at the heart of both his and Frege’s methodology. It was also central 
to the methodology of logical positivism, especially in the work of Carnap and 
Reichenbach, for whom ‘scientific philosophy’ was seen as the way forward.25 Indeed, the 
term ‘rational reconstruction’ was first brought to prominence in the book Carnap 
published in 1928, The Logical Construction of the World, and Reichenbach develops the 
idea further in his Experience and Prediction of 1938, in which he draws his famous 
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification.26 Of course, 
these ideas themselves had a ‘context of discovery’ that we should not pass over without 
comment: they would certainly have had a special resonance in the 1930s and 1940s, as 
‘conflicting fanaticisms’ were indeed raging across the world.27 
 Through his critical histories and rational reconstructions, and his methodological 
discussions of logical analysis and justification, Russell did more than any other 
philosopher to establish analytic philosophy as the tradition that it is now generally 
recognized as being. But this did not happen overnight or in ways that it might seem natural 
                                                
25 See especially Reichenbach 1951. 
26 For an account of the development of the idea of rational reconstruction, see Beaney 2013a. Cf. Schickore 
and Steinle 2006. 
27 As Nagel described one of the functions of analytic philosophy in 1936, “it requires quiet green pastures 
for intellectual analysis, wherein its practitioners can find refuge from a troubled world and cultivate their 
intellectual games with chess-like indifference to its course” (1936, p. 9). 
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to assume now, and the history of its establishment is instructive. Russell’s and Moore’s 
rebellion against British idealism took place during a relatively short period of time, 
between 1898 and 1903, but the naive realism they initially adopted was hardly distinctive 
in itself. Indeed, realism had already been taking over from idealism in Oxford at the time 
of their rebellion. Thomas Case, who was Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical 
Philosophy from 1889 to 1910, had published his Physical Realism in 1888, a book that 
even had ‘analytical philosophy’ in its subtitle, a term that is not used in any of Russell’s 
or Moore’s early writings. John Cook Wilson, who was Wykeham Professor of Logic from 
1889 to 1915, was by then consolidating his position as the leading figure in Oxford realism 
and on the Oxford scene generally, although he published little in his lifetime and his 
Statement and Inference only appeared posthumously, edited from his lecture notes by one 
of his former students.28 In the United States, there was also a realist movement, instigated 
by the so-called ‘new realists’ and continued by the ‘critical realists’. The former, 
comprising Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin, and Spaulding, published their 
manifesto in 1910 and their book, New Realism, in 1912.29 The latter, including Lovejoy, 
Santayana and Roy Wood Sellars, published their Essays in Critical Realism in 1920.30 
There were realist movements elsewhere, such as in Berlin, where Trendelenburg’s work 
inspired an Aristotelian realism with similarities to Oxford realism, and in Austria, led by 
Meinong, influenced by Bolzano and Brentano.31 
What was distinctive of Moore’s and Russell’s realism was the emphasis placed on 
analysis, even if this, too, was initially conceived rather naively, as simply involving 
decomposition. With the emergence of the theory of descriptions in 1905, however, 
Russell’s analytic methodology (and to a lesser extent Moore’s) became more 
                                                
28 Wilson 1926. For discussion of the Oxford realists, and in particular, Case and Cook Wilson, see Marion 
2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2009. On Case’s and Cook Wilson’s perceptual realism, see Hatfield’s chapter in this 
Handbook; and on Cook Wilson’s influence on later Oxford philosophers, see Beaney 2012a, and Travis and 
Kalderon’s chapter. 
29 Spaulding’s contribution was called ‘A Defense of Analysis’, certainly suggesting that Russell and the new 
realists were kindred spirits. 
30 Drake et al. 1920. See also Sellars 1916. For a brief account of early twentieth-century American realism, 
see Kuklick 2001, ch. 11. The movement is often forgotten: it receives virtually no discussion in The Oxford 
Handbook of American Philosophy (Misak 2008), for example. 
31 On the Austrian tradition in analytic philosophy, see Nyirí 1981, 1986; Simons 1992, 1999; Smith 1994; 
Textor 2006. Australian realism can be taken to begin in 1927, when Anderson (who had been influenced by 
Alexander, in particular) went to Sydney as Challis Professor of Philosophy and published ‘Empiricism’; see 
Baker 1986; Armstrong 2001. 
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sophisticated.32 There was still no talk of ‘analytic philosophy’, but in 1911 Russell gave a 
lecture to the Société Française de Philosophie entitled ‘Analytic Realism’. He described 
his philosophy as realist “because it claims that there are non-mental entities and that 
cognitive relations are external relations, which establish a direct link between the subject 
and a possibly non-mental object”, and as analytic “because it claims that the existence of 
the complex depends on the existence of the simple, and not vice versa, and that the 
constituent of a complex, taken as a constituent, is absolutely identical with itself as it is 
when we do not consider its relations” (1911c/1992, p. 133). He went on to characterize 
his philosophy as an ‘atomic philosophy’, and by the late 1910s, he was describing his 
position as ‘logical atomism’, a term that also came to be used, though not by Wittgenstein 
himself, for some of the central ideas of the Tractatus.33 
In 1924 Russell wrote an article entitled ‘Philosophy of the Twentieth Century’,34 
in which he divides academic philosophy into three groups: adherents of classical German 
philosophy, including Kantians and Hegelians; pragmatists and Bergson; and ‘realists’, 
understood as those who are scientifically minded (1924b/1943, p. 228). He admits that the 
division is not exclusive, suggesting that William James can be regarded as a founder of 
both pragmatism and realism. Russell quickly dismisses Hegelianism, taken as represented 
by Bradley, and goes on to consider the views of James and Bergson. In the final ten pages, 
he discusses the ‘new philosophy’ of realism, “characterized by analysis as a method and 
pluralism as a metaphysics” (1924b/1943, p. 240). He claims that it had three main sources, 
in theory of knowledge, logic, and the principles of mathematics. In logic, he notes that the 
‘organic’ view of the idealists is replaced by atomism, and as far as the principles of 
mathematics are concerned, he remarks that only the new philosophy has managed to 
                                                
32 See §1.1 of the previous chapter; and for more on Russell’s and Moore’s conceptions of analysis, and the 
range of conceptions that we find in the history of philosophy, see Beaney 2007c, 2009a. 
33 See Russell 1918, 1924a; repr. together in Russell 1972. Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism are 
discussed together in, for example, Urmson 1956, Part I. The first monograph on Wittgenstein’s logical 
atomism is Griffin 1964. On Russell’s logical atomism, see also Klement 2009, and on Wittgenstein’s logical 
atomism, see Proops 2007. 
34 The article was later reprinted in Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought, edited by 
Runes (1943). It opens Part II, which also includes chapters on Kantianism, Hegelianism, Thomist humanism, 
transcendental absolutism (by Santayana), personalism, phenomenology, logical empiricism (by Feigl), 
American realism, pragmatism (by Dewey), dialectical materialism, naturalism, and philosophies of China. 
The crudity of Russell’s typology is thus shown up by the rest of the book. The book also shows that ‘analytic 
philosophy’ is still far from being recognized as a distinct, let alone dominant, tradition. 
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accommodate the results of the work of Cantor, Frege, and others. In theory of knowledge, 
Russell claims that the new philosophy, as against Kant, maintains that “knowledge, as a 
rule, makes no difference to what is known”. This was one of the slogans of the Oxford 
realists, which Collingwood later notoriously thought he could refute in three sentences.35 
So although Cook Wilson and the other Oxford realists of the period failed to appreciate 
the significance of the development of mathematical logic,36 there is an extent to which 
they might be seen as enlisted by Russell in his group of twentieth-century philosophers. 
Whether or not one counts the Oxford realists as ‘analytic philosophers’ alongside Russell, 
Moore, and Wittgenstein, their views are clearly important in the bigger story of the history 
of analytic philosophy.37 
 
2.4 The early historical construction of analytic philosophy 
The first use of the term ‘analytic philosopher’ to refer to at least some of those whom we 
would now count as analytic philosophers does not occur until 1931, when we find it in 
Wisdom’s Interpretation and Analysis in Relation to Bentham’s Theory of Definition. 
Wisdom recognizes an anticipation of Russell’s theory of descriptions, in its use of 
contextual definition to do eliminativist work, by Bentham in his theory of fictions. Key 
here is what Bentham calls ‘paraphrasis’: “that sort of exposition which may be afforded 
by transmuting into a proposition, having for its subject some real entity, a proposition 
which has not for its subject any other than a fictitious entity”.38 Wisdom talks first of 
‘logico-analytic philosophers’ and then just ‘analytic philosophers’, understanding analysis 
as the analysis of facts we already know (1931, pp. 13-15). A year later, the idea of 
                                                
35 Collingwood 1939, p. 44, in the chapter entitled ‘The Decay of Realism’. For an account of his critique of 
the Oxford realists, see Beaney 2013b. 
36 In commenting on Russell’s paradox, in correspondence with Bosanquet in 1903, Cook Wilson had written: 
“I am afraid I am obliged to think that a man is conceited as well as silly to think such puerilities are worthy 
to be put in print: and it’s simply exasperating to think that he finds a publisher (where was the publisher’s 
reader?), and that in this way such contemptible stuff can even find its way into examinations” (1926, II, p. 
739). As Ayer later put it, Cook Wilson “had sat like Canute rebuking the advancing tide of mathematical 
logic” (1977, p. 77). 
37 In A Hundred Years of British Philosophy (1935 [1938]), Metz has a chapter on ‘The Older Realism’ (52 
pages), discussing Case and Cook Wilson, among others, and a chapter on ‘The New Realism’ (175 pages), 
discussing Moore, Russell, and Whitehead, among others. 
38 Bentham 1843, p. 246; quoted by Wisdom 1931, p. 92. On the significance of the idea of paraphrasis, see 
Beaney 2009a, §6. Cf. also Quine 1981b, pp. 68-9. 
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paraphrasis, though not the term, is picked up by Ryle in ‘Systematically Misleading 
Expressions’ (1932), in which he argues that the philosophical problems that are generated 
by certain kinds of expression (such as ones that appear to denote non-existent objects) can 
be resolved by rephrasing the relevant sentences. Neither Wisdom nor Ryle talk of ‘analytic 
philosophy’ (Wisdom just talks of ‘analytic philosophers’), but the explicit articulation of 
the idea of paraphrasis in the work of both Wisdom in Cambridge and Ryle in Oxford 
represents a definite stage in the construction of analytic philosophy as a tradition.39 
The first use of the term ‘analytic philosophy’ to refer to at least part of what we 
would now regard as the analytic tradition occurs in Collingwood’s Essay on Philosophical 
Method of 1933. He uses it to refer to one of two ‘sceptical positions’ that he attacks in 
chapter 7. What he has in mind, in particular, is the view according to which philosophy 
aims solely to analyse knowledge we already possess. He does not refer to Wisdom, but 
does mention Moore and Stebbing as advocates of this view. It is a ‘sceptical position’, he 
argues, because it denies that “constructive philosophical reasoning” is possible (1933, p. 
137), and he criticizes it for neglecting to examine its own presuppositions. Stebbing had 
herself drawn attention to this neglect in ‘The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics’ (1932), 
to which Collingwood refers, and she had attempted to identify these presuppositions, 
while admitting, however, that she could not see how they were justified. It is worth noting 
that what seems to have been the first use of ‘analytic philosophy’ occurs in a critique: it 
is often the case that positions are first clearly identified in attacking them.40 
Stebbing’s role in the story of analytic philosophy is frequently overlooked. In 
1930, she had published A Modern Introduction to Logic, which might be regarded as the 
first textbook of analytic philosophy. Her preface to the first edition opens with the remark 
that “The science of logic does not stand still”, and she notes that all the textbooks then in 
use in British universities make no reference to the developments in logic that had taken 
place in the previous 50 years. In setting out to correct this, she covers a wide range of 
                                                
39 Three years later, in Problems of Mind and Matter, Wisdom does indeed talk of ‘analytic philosophy’: he 
writes that his book is intended as an introduction to it, though he stresses that analytic philosophy “has no 
special subject matter” (1934, p. 2). Ryle, by contrast, never uses the term. In fact, his attack on ‘isms’ in 
philosophy (1937b) and his qualms about the notion of analysis (see e.g. 1957, pp. 263-4) suggests outright 
opposition to its use, even though he would agree with Wisdom that philosophy is an activity rather than a 
science. Cf. §1.4 of the previous chapter. 
40 For an account of Collingwood’s critique of analytic philosophy, see Beaney 2001; cf. 2005c. 
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topics, from the logical ideas of Principia Mathematica and Russell’s theory of 
descriptions, to various issues in scientific methodology and the theory of definition. In 
1933, together with Duncan-Jones, Mace, and Ryle, she founded the journal Analysis, 
initially conceived as the mouthpiece of the Cambridge School of Analysis. In the 
‘Statement of Policy’ that introduces the first issue, we read: “the contributions to be 
published will be concerned, as a rule, with the elucidation or explanation of facts, or 
groups of facts, the general nature of which is, by common consent, already known; rather 
than with attempts to establish new kinds of fact about the world, of very wide scope, or 
on a very large scale”. Although it has long since allowed a broader range of contributions, 
Analysis continues to be one of the flagships of analytic philosophy. In the first five 
volumes of the journal, there was a lot of discussion of the nature of analysis, a debate in 
which Stebbing’s work was influential.41 
One of Stebbing’s key papers in this debate was the lecture she gave to the British 
Academy in 1933, in which she compared the conceptions of analysis of the Cambridge 
School and logical positivism.42 This was one of the first attempts to bring together the two 
kinds of philosophy. It was also Stebbing who invited Carnap to London in 1934 to talk on 
philosophy and logical syntax, which introduced logical positivism to Britain, and where 
Carnap first met both Russell and Ayer. Stebbing thus played a crucial role in creating the 
dialogue between the Cambridge School of Analysis and logical positivism that was to 
provide a central theme in analytic philosophy as it developed in the 1930s. 
Although ‘analytic philosophy’ was first used to refer to the Cambridge School of 
Analysis, it was soon extended to include logical positivism as well. Here, too, though, the 
term was not initially used by the positivists themselves. There had been no mention of it 
in the manifesto of the Vienna Circle, published in 1929, where the key phrase was 
‘scientific world-conception’. Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein were mentioned as 
precursors, but as just three in a long list of other philosophers and scientists. In 1930 
                                                
41 On analysis, see also the supplementary volumes of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society published 
in 1934, where the question ‘Is analysis a useful method in philosophy?’ is debated by Black, Wisdom, and 
Cornforth, and 1937, where the question ‘Does philosophy analyse common sense?’ is debated by Duncan-
Jones and Ayer. 
42 Stebbing 1933a. Cf. Black 1938. For an account of Stebbing’s work on analysis, see Beaney 2003b. On 
the debate about analysis in the Cambridge School of Analysis, see Baldwin’s chapter in this Handbook. 
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Carnap and Reichenbach founded Erkenntnis as the journal of logical positivism, and the 
first issue opens with an article by Schlick entitled ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’. This 
turning point was made possible by the development of the new logic, Schlick argues, but 
what was crucial was the insights it fostered: into the nature of logic as purely formal and 
the nature of philosophy as an activity clarifying meaning rather than a science establishing 
truth. Schlick talks here of “the profound inner rules of logical syntax discovered by the 
new analysis” (1930/1959, p. 56), though not of ‘analytic philosophy’. There is similar talk 
in Carnap’s famous contribution to the second volume of Erkenntnis, ‘The Elimination of 
Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language’ (1932a). 
Talk of ‘logical analysis’, and the obvious influence of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus on 
the ideas of the logical positivists, clearly connected logical positivism to the Cambridge 
School of Analysis, and this connection was obvious to those who visited Europe from 
elsewhere. One such visitor was Ernest Nagel from Columbia University, who spent the 
academic year 1934-5 in Europe, and reported on his experiences for The Journal of 
Philosophy in ‘Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe’, published 
in January 1936. This is the first article with ‘analytic philosophy’ in its title, and the first 
article that refers to both Cambridge philosophy and the work of the Vienna Circle (and 
indeed, the Lvov–Warsaw School) as analytic philosophy. Nagel reports on “the 
philosophy professed at Cambridge, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, and Lwów” (1936, p. 6), but 
singles out the work of Moore, Wittgenstein, and Carnap for detailed discussion. 
Carnap never took to the term ‘analytic philosophy’. In July 1935 he wrote to Quine 
about the titles of the courses that he had agreed to give in the States, to where he emigrated 
in December that year. He notes that Nagel had suggested ‘analytic philosophy’ for the 
elementary course he had proposed on ‘wissenschaftliche Philosophie’, given that 
translating it as ‘scientific philosophy’ might suggest that his subject was philosophy of 
natural science, which would be too narrow. But, he goes on, “I should not like this title 
very much” (Quine and Carnap 1990, p. 181). In describing his work many years later in 
his intellectual autobiography (1963), he does not use the term. 
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The term ‘analytic philosophy’ did not really catch on until after the Second World 
War.43 By then many of the logical positivists who had emigrated to the States after the 
Nazis had come to power in Germany had established themselves in key philosophy 
departments, most notably, at Chicago, UCLA, Harvard, Princeton, Berkeley, Iowa, and 
Minnesota. There was also increasing contact between British and American philosophers. 
Many philosophers from the States, either as students or as faculty, spent at least a year at 
either Oxford or Cambridge, and many British philosophers visited the States to give 
lectures.44 The dialogue and cross-fertilization that this fostered made it natural to see a 
much broader movement developing, for which the umbrella term ‘analytic philosophy’ 
seemed eminently suitable. The first book to have this term in its title was Pap’s Elements 
of Analytic Philosophy, published in 1949. Pap distinguishes four main factions: 
Carnapians, Mooreans, Wittgensteinians or ‘therapeutic positivists’, and philosophers 
concerned to clarify the foundations of science and knowledge. That same year saw the 
publication of Feigl and Sellars’ classic collection, Readings in Philosophical Analysis. 
The title suggests that the emphasis is on the method of philosophical analysis rather than 
on a school or tradition of philosophical thought, but although the term ‘analytic 
philosophy’ is not used, the book made a major contribution to laying down the canon of 
analytic philosophy,45 and the new methodology was taken as marking “a decisive turn in 
the history of philosophy” (1949, p. vi). A further collection on Philosophical Analysis was 
published the following year, edited by Black (1950a). Black does talk here of ‘analytical 
philosophy’ (though only once, in the preface), but he cautions against treating 
‘Philosophical Analysis’ as forming “a ‘School’ having well defined articles of 
association” (1950b, p. 2). Rather, ‘analysis’ is used merely “to identify philosophers who 
share a common intellectual heritage and are committed to the clarification of basic 
philosophical concepts” (1950a, p. v).46 
                                                
43 As mentioned in n. 34 above, the collection on Twentieth Century Philosophy published in 1943, for 
example, makes no reference to ‘analytic philosophy’ as a distinct tradition. 
44 For details of some of the most significant visits, see the chronology that follows this chapter. 
45 For the record, the philosophers whose work is canonized are (in order of appearance): Feigl, Kneale, 
Quine, Tarski, Frege, Russell, Carnap, Lewis, Schlick, Aldrich, Ajdukiewicz, Nagel, Waismann, Hempel, 
Reichenbach, Moore, Stace, Sellars, Broad, Chisholm, Mace, Ducasse, Stevenson. Davidson (1980, p. 261) 
reports that he got through graduate school by reading Feigl and Sellars. 
46 The same caution had been urged by Black twelve years earlier (1938, p. 24). Black’s caution provides a 
straightforward counterexample to Preston’s claim that, from its earliest uses until at least the 1960s, 
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Further events strengthened this growing sense that a distinctive style or 
methodologically rooted tradition of philosophy had established itself. In 1950 Feigl and 
Sellars followed up their collection by founding the journal Philosophical Studies, which 
they edited until 1971. Reichenbach wrote a Whiggish history of the rise of scientific 
philosophy (1951). 1952 saw Austin and Hart become Professors at Oxford and Wisdom 
become Professor at Cambridge, and both Quine and Strawson published textbooks on 
logic. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations finally appeared in 1953, and both 
Quine and Wisdom published collections of their papers. 1953 also saw the first edition of 
Hospers’ Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. It was to go through three further editions 
over the next four decades and remains in print today, having introduced tens of thousands 
of students to analytic philosophy across the world.47 
In 1955 White edited the sixth volume, on twentieth-century philosophers, in a 
series on ‘The Great Ages of Western Philosophy’. Although the work of Croce, 
Santayana, Bergson, Husserl, and Sartre was represented, it was clear from the title – ‘The 
Age of Analysis’ – where the main action was now seen as taking place, in the analytic and 
pragmatist traditions. As White wrote in his preface, “the twentieth century has witnessed 
a great preoccupation with analysis as opposed to the large, synthetic, system-building of 
some other periods in the history of philosophy” (1955, p. 9). The other philosophers 
covered were Moore, Whitehead, Peirce, James, Dewey, Russell, Carnap, and 
Wittgenstein. Even if there was still reluctance to use the name itself, analytic philosophy 
did indeed appear to have come of age. 
                                                
“‘analytic philosophy’ in the nominative sense was employed clearly and consistently to refer to … a school 
of philosophy”, understood as defined doctrinally (2007, p. 79). Preston does not mention Black’s work. As 
I hope this chapter shows, the history of the construction of the analytic tradition is much more complex – 
and explicable – than Preston makes out in his claim that it is just the history of an illusion (on the grounds 
that there are no defining doctrines); cf. n. 56 in chapter 1 above. For criticism of Preston’s claim, see Beaney 
2007e. 
47 The first edition was published in the United States in 1953, but not in Britain until 1956, however. The 
first and second editions open with a chapter on philosophy and language, aimed at showing how 
philosophical problems can be clarified and some of them solved or dissolved by attention to the language in 
which they are formulated. The chapter was deleted in the third edition of 1990, but – after complaints – 
restored in a shorter form in the fourth edition of 1997, a history that is itself revealing of the development 
of analytic philosophy. The first chapter of the first edition is entitled ‘Words and the World’ and of the 
second edition (1967) ‘Meaning and Definition’, for example. The original title was restored in the fourth 
edition. On the changes here, see Hospers’ preface to the fourth edition. 
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2.5 Analytic philosophy and the early construction of its own history 
In retrospect, it might seem remarkable that even in the 1950s, the term ‘analytic 
philosophy’ was far from being widely used for the tradition that is now generally regarded 
as having originated more than half a century before then. However, traditions do not, of 
course, spring up overnight. Methodologies must be sufficiently developed and examples 
of their application (whether successful or instructively controversial) must be readily 
available. Their place in methodological space must be secured and recognizably defined, 
with appropriate contrasts drawn in opposition to rival traditions. They also need to have 
constructed enough of their history to boast a pedigree. 1956 heralded something of a 
watershed in all these respects. 
Four influential articles were published in 1956: Austin’s ‘A Plea for Excuses’, 
which offers the fullest statement of his methodology and illustrates its use; Grice and 
Strawson’s reply to Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, which highlighted 
a debate that has been central to the history of analytic philosophy;48 Sellars’ ‘Empiricism 
and the Philosophy of Mind’, where his famous critique of the ‘myth of the given’ was first 
articulated; and Place’s ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, which helped inaugurate a 
new phase in the development of philosophy of mind by arguing for the mind/brain identity 
thesis.49 The first edition of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
was also published that year, as well as two collections of the most important of their papers 
by Russell and Tarski – Logic and Knowledge and Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, 
respectively. These three books made clear just how deeply interconnected the concern 
with the foundations of mathematics is with issues in semantics and the philosophy of 
language, interconnections that have also been at the heart of analytic philosophy.50 
                                                
48 For discussion of this debate, see the chapters by Baghramian and Jorgensen and by Shieh in this 
Handbook. 
49 See Crawford’s chapter in this Handbook. For some other articles published in 1956, see the chronology 
that follows this chapter. Mention might also be made, for example, of the article by Chisholm in which he 
defends Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the mark of the psychological. A translation of Tarski’s 
seminal paper on truth (1933) was also published that year. 
50 On the importance of recognizing this, see Floyd 2009, especially p. 164; and for more on this theme, see 
Floyd’s chapter in this Handbook. 
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Two monographs helped consolidate the place of analytic philosophy in the history 
of philosophy, though in different ways. Urmson’s Philosophical Analysis: Its 
Development between the Two World Wars (1956) was the first history of analytic 
philosophy, discussing the rise and fall of both logical atomism and logical positivism, 
partly with the aim of clearing the ground for the new philosophy that was then emerging. 
(‘Philosophical Analysis’ is the title of the book, but Urmson also talks of ‘analysts’, 
‘analytic theories’, ‘analytic philosophers’, and the like.) What was conceived as the 
‘analytic movement’ was, in fact, something whose obituary was being written (cf. 1956, 
pp. 186-7). Historiography is always rich in irony, but it is certainly ironic that at the very 
point at which its obituary was being written, analytic philosophy was about to blossom 
into the dominant tradition in twentieth-century philosophy that it is now recognized as 
being. (It gives a twist to Russell’s remark, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, that 
“only the dead exist fully”.) Of course, it did so by greatly broadening the meaning of 
‘analysis’, as a limited number of reductive forms of analysis gave way to various forms 
of connective analysis, and in turn to the whole range of forms combining reductive and 
connective analysis in different ways that characterizes the contemporary scene.51 
One account that brought together some of these different forms of analysis was 
offered in White’s Toward Reunion in Philosophy (1956), which sought to show how the 
various strands of the analytic tradition merge with pragmatism once we recognize that 
describing, performing, and evaluating are all part of philosophizing. The book was based 
on a course on ‘Problems of Analytic Philosophy’ that White had begun teaching in the 
early 1950s at Harvard, which may have been the first course with ‘analytic philosophy’ in 
its title, although White remarks that it might just as well have been called “the Philosophy 
of Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and a Few Others with Whom They Have 
Succeeded in Communicating” (1999, p. 129). White’s teaching at Harvard influenced a 
generation of analytic philosophers, including Cavell and Dreben, who were assistants on 
his course (1956, p. xi). 
                                                
51 For an account of the range of different conceptions of analysis, see Beaney 2009a. On the distinction 
between reductive and connective analysis, see Strawson 1992, ch. 2. 
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Two other books published in 1956 deserve mention here, which illustrate the 
growing dominance of analytic philosophy in all areas of philosophy and in perceptions of 
philosophy outside the academy. The first is Laslett’s collection of essays, Philosophy, 
Politics and Society, which might be taken to mark the beginning of analytic political 
philosophy. The collection was the first in a series of volumes edited by Laslett and others 
over the next 50 years, which show how analytic political philosophy developed. This first 
volume was published just two years after Elton’s collection on Aesthetics and Language 
(1954), which marks the beginning of analytic aesthetics.52 
The second book, The Revolution in Philosophy, consists of essays that originated 
in a series of talks given on the Third Programme of the BBC. In introducing the book, 
Ryle remarks that “History begins only when memory’s dust has settled” (Ayer et al. 1956, 
p. 1), and suggests that twentieth-century philosophy is largely the story of the notion of 
‘meaning’ (Ayer et al. 1956, p. 8), implying, though not explicitly asserting, that concern 
with meaning is the ‘revolution’ to which the title of the book refers. Chapters on Bradley 
(by Wollheim), Frege (by Kneale), logical atomism (by Pears), Moore (by Paul), the 
Vienna Circle (by Ayer), the later Wittgenstein (also by Paul), and two chapters on analysis 
(by Strawson and Warnock) follow. The chapter on Frege is worth noting: it marks the 
entry of Frege into the pantheon of analytic philosophers. We will return to this in the next 
section. 
In the decade that followed, many more classics of analytic philosophy appeared, 
from Anscombe’s Intention (1957) and Chisholm’s Perceiving (1957), through Strawson’s 
Individuals (1959) and Quine’s Word and Object (1960), to Rorty’s collection on The 
Linguistic Turn, to mention just some of the highlights.53 After positivist savaging, 
Strawson’s book restored metaphysics to analytic respectability, albeit in a ‘descriptive’ 
rather than ‘revisionary’ form. Rorty’s collection gave wide currency not only to talk of 
‘the linguistic turn’ but also to the idea of there being two conflicting strands within 
                                                
52 On the development of analytic political philosophy and analytic aesthetics, respectively, see Wolff’s and 
Lamarque’s chapters in this Handbook. 
53 For many more see the chronology that follows this chapter. 
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linguistic philosophy – ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy.54 
During the same period, further books on the history of philosophy appeared, including 
two editions of Passmore’s A Hundred Years of Philosophy (1957, 1966), G. J. Warnock’s 
English Philosophy since 1900 (1958, 1969), and Mary Warnock’s Ethics since 1900 
(1960, 1966). G. J. Warnock’s book is highly parochial, giving the false impression that 
English philosophy is simply analytic philosophy: he discusses Moore, Russell, logical 
positivism, and Wittgenstein before passing on to his Oxford colleagues.55 Passmore’s 
book, by contrast, is admirably comprehensive, even from the English perspective he 
admits he has. Beginning with Mill, he covers various forms of idealism, naturalism, 
realism, and pragmatism, as well as developments in logic, logical positivism, ordinary 
language philosophy, existentialism, and phenomenology. Cook Wilson, Collingwood, and 
Heidegger are discussed, for example, as well as Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein.56 Mary 
Warnock’s book is also written from an English perspective, spiced by token exotic 
flavours from America and France, with chapters on Bradley, Moore, Prichard’s and Ross’ 
intuitionism, Ayer’s and Stevenson’s emotivism, Hare, and Sartre’s existentialism.57 
 One other event from this period deserves mention here: the Royaumont 
colloquium of 1958.58 Entitled ‘La Philosophie Analytique’, this was intended to facilitate 
dialogue between analytic philosophers and philosophers from continental Europe. 
Participants included Ryle, Austin, Strawson, Quine, Williams, Urmson, Hare, Merleau-
Ponty, Wahl, and van Breda (the founder of the Husserl archives at Leuven). Various myths 
have grown up about this conference, and it is often seen as having only further cemented 
the idea of a rift between analytic and ‘continental’ philosophy. Many of the myths have 
                                                
54 Rorty notes in his introduction (1967, p. 9) that the term ‘the linguistic turn’ was introduced by Bergmann. 
Bergmann uses it in his review of Strawson’s Individuals (Bergmann 1960). On Bergmann and the 
significance of the linguistic turn, see Hacker’s chapter in this Handbook. 
55 The first edition contains a (weak) chapter on logic, removed in the second edition on the (mistaken) 
grounds that it was no longer characteristic of English philosophy. However, he does add (justifiably) some 
paragraphs on Cook Wilson. (Cf. his preface to the second edition.) 
56 As well as incorporating revisions, the second edition also contains an additional final chapter entitled 
‘Description, Explanation or Revision?’, responding to the issues raised by Strawson’s Individuals (1959). 
57 Only six years separate the first and second editions, but a third edition was published in 1978. Here 
Warnock adds a postscript on, among other works, Rawls’ Theory of Justice, noting in her preface that it no 
longer seems possible to distinguish moral from political philosophy. On developments in ethics and political 
philosophy in the analytic tradition, see the chapters by Dancy, Driver, and Wolff in this Handbook. 
58 The proceedings were published in Cahiers de Royaumont, 1962. 
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now been exploded,59 and the term ‘continental philosophy’ is highly problematic and 
unfortunate, not least because it both includes and excludes far too much.60 In fact, just as 
in the case of ‘analytic philosophy’, the term ‘continental philosophy’ only gained currency 
well over 50 years after the relevant supposed origins. In his own paper at the conference, 
Ryle uses the term in talking of “the wide gulf that has existed for three-quarters of a 
century between Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy”, meaning by ‘Continental 
philosophy’ primarily phenomenology.61 The term was also used, in a similar sense, by 
Mandelbaum in his Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association in 
December 1962. Mandelbaum talks here of “two movements which, together, may be said 
to dominate philosophy”, namely, “that species of analytic philosophy which stems from 
Moore and the later Wittgenstein” and “the phenomenological–existentialist movement 
which is characteristic of philosophy on the Continent”, which he immediately goes on to 
call ‘Continental philosophy’ (1962, p. 7). That there is a ‘phenomenological–
existentialist’ tradition is uncontroversial, though some may prefer to talk of two – albeit 
connected – traditions here; but it is misleading to use a geographical term to designate 
this. Nevertheless, its misleading character aside, many of the arguments that inevitably go 
on in philosophy departments when new appointments are made and public profiles are 
produced gradually came to be construed as battles between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ 
philosophers, especially in the United States and Britain. These battles further illustrate 
                                                
59 See especially Overgaard 2010; Vrahimis 2013. 
60 Despite making this point, Leiter and Rosen persist in using the term ‘continental philosophy’ for what 
they call “(primarily) philosophy after Kant in Germany and France in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries”, on the grounds of there being no better alternative term, though they only consider ‘post-Kantian’ 
and ‘post-Hegelian’ (2007b, p. 2). Of course, they can hardly avoid so persisting in a Handbook of 
Continental Philosophy, but that the ‘Continent’ should be identified (even ‘primarily’) with Germany and 
France is only the most immediately obvious objection. For much fuller discussion of the question ‘What is 
continental philosophy?’, and attempts to (re)construct a tradition out of all the disparate ‘non-analytic’ 
traditions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western philosophy, see Critchley 1997, 2001; Glendinning 
1999b, 2006; Boundas 2007c; cf. Mulligan 1991b. A far more monumental construction is provided by 
Schrift 2010–. On the controversial relationship between analytic and ‘continental’ philosophy, see Agostini 
1997; Akehurst 2008; Buckle 2004; Campbell 2001; Carman 2007; Chase and Reynolds 2011; Cooper 1994; 
Dascal 2001; Egginton and Sandbothe 2004; Glendinning 2002; Glock 2008, ch. 3; Himanka 2000; Levy 
2003; Mandelbaum 1962; May 2002; Prado 2003; Reynolds et al. 2010; Richmond 1996; Rosen 2001; 
Simons 2001; Staten 1984; Williams 1996 (where the analytic/continental distinction is compared to dividing 
cars into front-wheel drive and Japanese; p. 25). 
61 Ryle 1962 [1971a], p. 189. Ryle’s paper was called ‘Phenomenology versus “The Concept of Mind”’, and 
he provocatively suggests that his own book “could be described as a sustained essay in phenomenology, if 
you are at home with that label” (p. 196). A few years earlier, Austin had suggested that he was doing 
‘linguistic phenomenology’ (1956 [1979], p. 182). 
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just how the analytic tradition was partly constructed and consolidated in opposition to 
rival (constructed) traditions. 
 
2.6 The canonization of Frege 
With the exception of selections from the Basic Laws of Arithmetic published in The Monist 
in 1915–17, there were no English translations of Frege’s work until 1948, when Black 
published his translation of ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ in the Philosophical Review. A 
second translation was published by Feigl the following year in Feigl and Sellars’ Readings 
in Philosophical Analysis. In 1950 Austin’s translation of The Foundations of Arithmetic 
appeared, and in 1952 Geach and Black published their Translations from the 
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Russell, Wittgenstein, and Carnap, in particular, 
had all acknowledged the importance and influence upon them of Frege’s work; but it was 
only once Frege’s writings were readily available in translation that English-speaking 
analytic philosophers began to pay attention to Frege.62 Articles on Frege started to appear 
in the main philosophical journals in the 1950s,63 and as mentioned above, Kneale 
contributed a chapter on Frege to The Revolution in Philosophy, published in 1956. 
Two books stand out as crucial in the subsequent canonization of Frege as an 
analytic philosopher. The first is Anscombe’s Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 
published in 1959, in which she argued that failure to appreciate Frege’s work was the main 
cause of the ‘irrelevance’ of much of what had hitherto been published on Wittgenstein.64 
The early Wittgenstein ceased to be either bracketed with (middle) Russell as a logical 
atomist or regarded as a proto-positivist, but instead was seen as responding, at a deep 
level, to problems in Frege’s philosophy. The second book is Dummett’s monumental 
work, Frege: Philosophy of Language, published in 1973, in which Frege finally emerged 
from the shadows of other philosophers and came to be seen as a significant philosopher 
                                                
62 The exception, of course, was Russell, who had provided the first account in English of Frege’s philosophy 
in Appendix A of The Principles of Mathematics in 1903. Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity of 1947 also 
contains significant discussion of Frege’s ideas. 
63 Many of these were reprinted in Klemke 1968, the first collection of papers on Frege. 
64 Cf. Anscombe 1959, p. 12. On the importance of Anscombe’s book for our understanding of Wittgenstein, 
see Diamond’s chapter in this Handbook. For further discussion of the influence of Frege on Wittgenstein, 
see the works cited in n. 17 of the previous chapter. 
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in his own right, with a semantic theory, so Dummett argued, that could be developed and 
employed in reformulating and solving many of the traditional problems of philosophy.65 
Dummett was not the only philosopher who held that the development of semantic 
theory was the key to dealing with a whole host of problems in the philosophy of language 
and mind. In a series of papers from the late 1960s, Davidson had advocated a similar 
programme.66 In seeing a theory of truth as providing the basis for a theory of meaning, 
Davidson drew on Tarski’s work as well as Frege’s, further widening the sphere of analytic 
philosophy and reconnecting with earlier philosophers and logicians.67 The so-called 
Davidsonic boom hit Oxford in the 1970s, combining with Dummett’s work to gradually 
loosen the hold that ‘ordinary language philosophy’ had had in Britain after the Second 
World War. This decline of ordinary language philosophy may also have increased 
willingness to use ‘analytic philosophy’ rather than ‘linguistic philosophy’ as the generic 
term for the various strands of the analytic tradition, including both ordinary language 
philosophy and ‘ideal language philosophy’.68 
In the States, the work of Quine, Kripke, and Putnam, criticizing many of the 
assumptions and doctrines of earlier analytic philosophy concerning meaning and the 
analytic/synthetic, a priori/a posteriori, and necessary/contingent distinctions, led to further 
distancing from that period.69 For some, this was seen as inaugurating an era of ‘post-
analytic philosophy’,70 but most simply saw it as initiating a new phase of analytic 
philosophy, with a deepening and broadening of its various concerns in a revised form. 
With metaphysics firmly back on the agenda, ‘analytic metaphysics’ developed, bringing 
with it a whole range of issues, from the ontology of possible worlds to the metaphysics of 
mind.71 This reinforced reconnection with the earliest phase of analytic philosophy, when 
                                                
65 For more on the importance of Frege in the development of history of analytic philosophy, see Floyd 2009, 
§4. 
66 See the papers collected in Davidson 1984. 
67 On the development of theories of meaning, see Miller’s chapter in this Handbook. 
68 On linguistic philosophy as comprised of these two strands, see especially Rorty 1967 (as mentioned 
above). The rise and fall (and historical construction) of linguistic philosophy deserves its own separate 
treatment. For accounts, see Hacking 1975; Hanfling 2000; Hallett 2008; Beaney 2012a. For classic critiques 
of linguistic philosophy, see Gellner 1959; Mundle 1970. 
69 For an account of the work of Quine, Kripke, and Putnam, see Baghramian and Jorgensen’s chapter in this 
Handbook. 
70 For references, see n. 7 of the previous chapter. 
71 For an account of metaphysics in the analytic tradition, see Simons’ chapter in this Handbook. 
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metaphysics had not been repudiated,72 and even pushed back the boundaries of what 
counts as this earliest phase, to include such remoter ancestors as Bolzano, who had 
criticized Kantian modal conceptions long before Quine, Kripke, and others.73 
 
2.7 The historical turn in analytic philosophy 
In his introduction to Frege: Philosophy of Language, Dummett notoriously claimed that 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift “is astonishing because it has no predecessors: it appears to have 
been born from Frege’s brain unfertilized by external influences” (1973, p. xxxv). He 
repeats the claim in his second book on Frege, alleging further that the philosophical system 
Frege constructed on the basis of his logic “owed, I believe, not very much more to previous 
philosophical work than did his formal logic to previous work in that field” (1981a, p. xvii). 
In creating quantificational logic, Frege’s Begriffsschrift was indeed revolutionary, and his 
philosophy was undoubtedly driven by concern to articulate a corresponding epistemology 
and metaphysics;74 but all this was far from unfertilized by external influences. Sluga was 
the first to show how mistaken Dummett’s historiography was, and since then much light 
has been shed on both the philosophical and the mathematical context of Frege’s work.75 
To take just one example: we now know that the very name ‘Begriffsschrift’ shows the 
influence of Trendelenburg and, through him, of Wilhelm von Humboldt.76 
 The controversy over the interpretation of Frege brought to a head the growing 
sense, even within the analytic tradition, of the impoverished understanding that analytic 
                                                
72 On the metaphysics of early analytic philosophy, see Beaney 2012b. 
73 On Bolzano’s critique of Kant, see Lapointe 2011, and Textor’s chapter in this Handbook. 
74 I talk neutrally here of ‘corresponding’, since the question of the relative priority of Frege’s logic, 
epistemology, and metaphysics is controversial. I am convinced, however, that Frege’s philosophy essentially 
arose from thinking through the implications of his use of function–argument analysis, extended from 
mathematics to logic. For elaboration of this, see e.g. Beaney 2007d, 2011a, 2012b. 
75 See especially Sluga 1980, and for subsequent accounts of Frege that are more historically informed, see 
e.g. Baker and Hacker 1984a; Weiner 1990; Carl 1994; Beaney 1996; Burge 2005 (which collects together 
his papers on Frege from 1979 onwards); Kienzler 2009; Künne 2010. On the historical context of Frege’s 
work, see especially Gabriel and Kienzler 1997; Gabriel and Dathe 2000; the papers in vol. 1 of Beaney and 
Reck 2005; and Gabriel’s chapter in this Handbook. On the mathematical background, see the papers in vol. 
3 of Beaney and Reck 2005; Tappenden 2005, 2006; Wilson 2010; Hallett 2010; and Tappenden’s chapter 
in this Handbook. On Frege’s influence on subsequent philosophy, see Burge’s chapter. 
76 See Thiel 1995/2005; Gabriel’s chapter in this Handbook. 
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philosophers had of their own history and of historiographical issues.77 Historiographical 
debates had already been going on in history and philosophy of science, inspired, in 
particular, by Kuhn’s paradigm-shifting work of 1962, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. This had encouraged more detailed investigation of the historical 
development of science, and deeper reflection about methodology, led, most notably, by 
Lakatos, whose work was published in the 1970s. In history of ideas, and especially history 
of political thought, too, there was increasing discussion of historiography, Skinner’s 
‘Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas’ of 1969 being particularly influential. 
In 1979 Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature appeared, which put grand narratives 
back on the table at the same time as questioning the continued existence of analytic 
philosophy (see e.g. p. 172), thereby raising the stakes for the historiographical self-
consciousness of analytic philosophers. 
In 1984, Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner edited a landmark collection of papers 
entitled ‘Philosophy in History’. Part I contains historiographical essays and Part II case-
studies, including three in history of analytic philosophy: on Frege (by Sluga), Moore (by 
Baldwin), and Russell (by Hylton). In his own contribution to Part I Rorty distinguishes 
and discusses four genres in the historiography of philosophy: rational reconstruction, 
historical reconstruction, Geistesgeschichte, and doxography. The first three correspond, 
more or less, to Nietzsche’s three species of history: critical, antiquarian, and monumental, 
respectively. Rational reconstruction we have already noted is illustrated by Russell’s early 
book on Leibniz and is the most characteristic genre in analytic philosophy. Dummett’s 
first book on Frege provides another example, though here there are also aspects of 
Geistesgeschichte – monumentalizing Frege in the history of philosophy as the first person 
(rightly, on Dummett’s view) to make the theory of meaning the foundation of all 
philosophy.78 Rorty characterizes Geistesgeschichte as “big sweeping” stories that aim at 
“self-justification in the same way as does rational reconstruction, but on a different scale” 
                                                
77 Other controversies that might be mentioned here include the debate about Kripke’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following and private language, and the question of the influences on Carnap 
and other members of the Vienna Circle. Early criticisms of Kripke’s interpretation include Baker and Hacker 
1984b and McGinn 1984. Investigation of the influences on Carnap was spearheaded by Coffa and Friedman 
in the early 1980s. Coffa’s work was eventually published in 1991, and a collection of Friedman’s papers 
appeared in 1999. 
78 See especially 1973, ch. 19; 1981a, ch. 3. 
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(1984, pp. 56-7). His own Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature clearly falls into this 
category. Geistesgeschichte play a central role in canon-formation, unlike doxography, 
which takes a canon for granted. Doxography, as Rorty conceives it, is based on the 
assumption that philosophical positions are eternally given, implying that history of 
philosophy is simply a matter of working out which positions a philosopher holds. As we 
have also already noted, doxography is illustrated in Frege’s and Russell’s writings on the 
history of philosophy. 
Rational reconstructions and Geistesgeschichte inevitably prompt historical 
reconstruction, where antiquarian impulses seek to correct the distortions that the former 
involve. Sometimes this results in very detailed studies where antiquarianism rules; but it 
usually inspires accounts that combine rational and historical reconstruction in more 
satisfying ways. This is exactly what happened in the history of analytic philosophy – or 
the history of the historiography of analytic philosophy. At the beginning of the 1990s a 
wealth of works appeared that marked the beginning of history of analytic philosophy as a 
recognized subfield of philosophy. Two books on Russell, by Hylton (1990) and Griffin 
(1991), offered careful reconstructions of the development of Russell’s early views, setting 
new standards of scholarship. This was reinforced by Baldwin’s book on Moore (1990), 
which provided the first substantial account of the full range of Moore’s philosophy. 
Weiner’s book on Frege sought to show how Frege’s philosophical thinking emerged out 
of his mathematical concerns, rejecting the assumption that Frege could be treated as “truly 
one of us” (1990, p. 2). A collection of Diamond’s papers appeared (1991), which included 
her influential readings of Frege and Wittgenstein that were to inspire the ‘New 
Wittgenstein’ debate a decade later (see especially Crary and Read 2000). Monk’s 
biography of Wittgenstein was published (1990), which, alongside McGuinness’ earlier 
biography of the young Wittgenstein (1988), provided much-needed context to 
Wittgenstein’s often enigmatic remarks. A new collection on the analytic tradition reflected 
the historical turn that was taking place (Bell and Cooper 1990), and Coffa’s long-awaited 
book on logical positivism appeared, reconstructing a ‘semantic tradition’, as he called it 
(1991). Uebel also published a monograph on logical positivism (1992), elucidating the 
internal debates within the Vienna Circle. Simons brought out a collection of essays on the 
Central European tradition in analytic philosophy (1992). Dummett made two further 
 The historiography of analytic philosophy 31 
important contributions: Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics (1991a), the sequel to his first 
book on Frege, was far more sensitive to the development of Frege’s thinking; and Frege 
and Other Philosophers (1991b), a collection of his papers, contained responses to some 
of his critics. Two years later he also published Origins of Analytical Philosophy (1993a), 
goaded by the Zeitgeist, but bizarrely, discussing only Frege and Husserl. Bell’s book on 
Husserl (1990), written from an analytic perspective, also helped encourage dialogue 
between analytic philosophers and phenomenologists, even if controversy is never far away 
in such dialogue. 
These books transformed the landscape of analytic philosophy.79 In the new 
constituent field of history of analytic philosophy, articles, monographs, collections, 
biographies, and autobiographies have been appearing with ever increasing frequency.80 
Coupled with a stream of new editions and translations of the work of analytic philosophers 
(both well-known and lesser-known) and the burgeoning textbook industry that seeks to 
introduce that work to new generations of students right across the world, history of 
analytic philosophy now rivals more established areas of history of philosophy, such as 
history of ancient Greek philosophy and history of early modern philosophy, in terms of 
the number of academics that record it as one of their research and teaching interests.81 
In general, however, standards of historical scholarship in history of analytic 
philosophy have not yet reached the level that they are in history of ancient Greek 
philosophy and early modern philosophy. Rational reconstructions are still offered that 
have not learnt from the historical studies that are now available. Impressive as it may be 
as a series of rational reconstructions of canonical texts in the history of analytic 
philosophy, Soames’ Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century (2003), for example, 
still presents Russell’s theory of descriptions without mentioning Russell’s earlier theory 
of denoting; thinking through the problems faced by the latter is what actually led Russell 
                                                
79 For further discussion of the historical turn in analytic philosophy, see the papers in Reck 2013. 
80 For some of the highlights, see the chronology and bibliography that follow this chapter. 
81 Ten years ago, only a handful of philosophers recorded history of analytic philosophy as an area of research 
specialism or teaching competence. Today most medium or large English-speaking departments have at least 
one person who gives this as one of their areas. In Leiter’s ‘Philosophical Gourmet Report’ 
<http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com>, history of analytic philosophy (including Wittgenstein) is one of 
the specialities evaluated, one of nine history of philosophy specialities. 
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to the former.82 Doxography, too, will always be a temptation that serious history of 
philosophy must avoid. It is all too easy to take a canon for granted and ignore broader 
questions of context and connection, questions that are essential to address in developing 
awareness of the contingency and negotiability of canons. 
In his discussion of historiography, Rorty criticizes doxography for its 
complacency about canon-formation. But he stresses how the other three genres 
complement one another. He notes that there is a ‘hermeneutic circle’ of rational and 
historical reconstruction, around which one must go many times before doing either sort of 
reconstruction, and talks of the tension between rational and historical reconstruction that 
generates the need for the self-justification that Geistegeschichte provides.83 Ideally, 
balance between the genres should be struck in all work in history of philosophy; but this 
would be unrealistic. A more tolerant attitude is to recognize the diversity of approaches 
and encourage that diversity in the hope that the balance will be achieved over time in the 
ongoing and self-correcting work of the academic community as a whole.84 
In 2007 a new book series on the history of analytic philosophy was established, 
the first series of its kind, and the first volume was published in 2008.85 In 2010, following 
the founding of the Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, an online 
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy was launched, again the first of its kind, 
and its first issue appeared in 2011.86 In the case of both the series and the journal, ‘history 
                                                
82 Soames’ work has been especially controversial. For reviews, see e.g. Kremer 2005; Rorty 2005; Beaney 
2006b; Hacker 2006; Wilson 2006b. For his replies to critics, see Soames 2006a, 2006b. Cf. also Floyd 2009. 
For deeper understanding of Russell’s theory of descriptions, see Hylton 1990, 2003; Linsky and Imaguire 
2005; Stevens 2011. 
83 1984, p. 53, fn. 1; p. 68. I discuss rational and historical reconstruction further, and offer my own resolution 
of the tension in what I call ‘dialectical reconstruction’ in Beaney 1996, ch. 1; 2013a. 
84 This has been the editorial policy in the present Handbook, within the obvious constraints of seeking 
representative coverage of the main philosophers, views, and themes. 
85 The series was inspired by Candlish’s monograph on the Russell/Bradley dispute (2007), which was 
reissued in paperback as the third volume of the series (see Beaney 2009b). The first volume was Nasim 
2008, and there are now over 20 volumes published, with many more in the pipeline. For the record, the 
volumes are, in order: Nasim 2008, Wagner 2009, Candlish 2009 [2007], Venturinha 2010, Coliva 2010, 
Lapointe 2011, Stevens 2011, Patterson 2012, Landini 2012, Duke 2012, Wagner 2012, Gandon 2012, Pardey 
2012, Textor 2013, Korhonen 2013, Chapman 2013, Engelmann 2013, Reck 2013, D’Oro and Sandis 2013, 
Mulligan, Kijania-Placek and Placek 2013, Schaar 2013, Arana and Alvarez 2013, Preti 2013, Griffin and 
Linsky 2013, Carey 2013. For details, see the website for the series: 
<http://www.palgrave.com/products/series.aspx?s=hap>. See also the chronology that follows this chapter. 
86 Information on the Society and Journal can be found at: 
<http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~philos/sshap> and <http://jhaponline.org>, respectively. 
 The historiography of analytic philosophy 33 
of analytic philosophy’ is understood broadly, to include interconnections with other 
traditions and the work of philosophers who might be regarded as outside the analytic 
tradition. In both cases, too, the interaction between history of analytic philosophy and 
contemporary analytic philosophy is stressed, an interaction that is seen as mutually 
beneficial. The present Oxford Handbook draws on and deepens the historical turn that has 
taken place in analytic philosophy, and the range of contributions from leading scholars 
that it contains testifies to the richness and significance of the work that is now being done 
in the field. 
 
2.8 Analytic philosophy and history of analytic philosophy 
The historical turn in analytic philosophy has given fresh impetus and added relevance to 
the debates about the relationship between philosophy and history of philosophy that have 
taken place since the emergence of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers are now 
more aware that their rational reconstructions are contested, that interpretations of the 
views even of their own immediate predecessors cannot be taken for granted, that their own 
concepts, doctrines, positions, and problems have a history, that their assumptions have a 
context that may need to be explained, that there have been changes and fashions in their 
own tradition, and so on. I conclude this chapter by saying something in defence of the 
historical turn that has taken place. 
As we have seen, from its origins in the work of Frege and Russell, analytic 
philosophy has had ahistorical tendencies. Analytic philosophers have engaged in history 
of philosophy, but often only to the extent of offering – or sometimes simply borrowing – 
rational reconstructions to further their own projects. They have tended to be uninterested 
in doing justice to the philosophers whose work they reconstruct, or in getting the historical 
facts right.87 Given that the early analytic philosophers were all realists, this might seem 
ironic. Their mathematical and scientific realism, or epistemological and metaphysical 
realism, seems not to have been matched by any respect for historical realism. Such 
                                                
87 As Kripke notoriously put it in introducing his ‘sceptical interpretation’ of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-
following, “my method is to present the argument as it struck me, as it presented a problem for me” (1982, 
p. viii). Light was eventually shed on those remarks, but only by recognizing the differences between 
Kripkenstein, as Kripke’s Wittgenstein came to be called, and Wittgenstein himself. 
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analytic philosophers need not repudiate historical realism; they may complain as loudly 
as anyone else when their own views are misinterpreted. Rather, they simply deny its 
relevance: while there are historical facts of the matter about philosophers’ actual views, 
this is for the historian to establish, not the philosopher. On their view, philosophical 
concepts, doctrines, positions, and problems are independent of their articulation by any 
particular person, and hence their attribution or misattribution to anyone is of no ultimate 
significance. 
This is not the place for a full critique of ahistoricism.88 I will make just four points 
here, drawing on what has been said in both this and the previous chapter. First of all, 
philosophical terminology is created and shaped by the uses of the past, and is essentially 
and inevitably contested, even if there are periods of consensus or local contexts where 
there is relative agreement. In the historical longer run, clarification is always needed, 
which requires serious engagement with past philosophical views. This is most obviously 
so when terms like ‘Kantian’, ‘Fregean’, or ‘Russellian’ are in play. To use such terms is 
to accept a commitment to justify that use by reference to some view that Kant, Frege, or 
Russell, respectively, actually held at some point. But there are similar commitments in the 
case of terms such as ‘analytic’ or ‘necessary’. In defining ‘analytic’ in the way he did in 
the Foundations, for example, Frege transformed Kant’s notion, even if he himself wrote 
that he did not intend to introduce a new sense, “but only to capture what earlier writers, in 
particular Kant, have meant” (1884, §3). To what extent this is actually so requires 
investigation of what Kant meant and any assessment of a claim about the ‘analyticity’ of 
a proposition requires explanation of the intended sense. 
Of course, one might respond that as long as one defines what one means by a term, 
one can use it (Humpty-Dumpty-like) in whatever way one wants. However, any such 
definition will itself use further terms, and as Frege recognized, not everything can be 
defined, and at some point, at the most basic level, we have to rely on a ‘meeting of minds’. 
So elucidation, as he called it, is always required; and this, too, as I suggested in section 
                                                
88 For fuller discussion, see especially the essays in Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner 1984; Hare 1988; Sorell 
and Rogers 2005; Reck 2013. See also Glock 2008, ch. 4, and some of the replies in the special issue (no. 1) 
of Teorema, 30 (2011). For an account of the German historicist tradition, see Beiser 2011. 
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2.2, has an historical dimension, since new views need to be positioned within the historical 
space of previous views if they are to be properly understood.89 
This leads on to a second criticism of ahistoricism. Philosophical concepts, 
doctrines, positions, and problems can indeed be regarded as independent of their 
articulation by any particular person – but only up to a point, or within local contexts, 
contexts that embed shared presuppositions or where a ‘meeting of minds’ can be relied 
upon. Debates involving those concepts, doctrines, positions, and problems depend on 
these shared presuppositions, which may not be explicitly articulated by the protagonists, 
but some of which may well need to be recognized for the debates to progress – whether 
to deepen the arguments, resolve the disagreements, overcome any stalemates, or diagnose 
any mistaken assumptions. As mentioned in section 2.4 above, Stebbing admitted that the 
Cambridge School of Analysis involved presuppositions that she was unable to justify, and 
this prompted Collingwood to criticize analytic philosophy for this failing, and later, more 
constructively, to articulate a view of philosophy in which the identification of 
presuppositions was its primary goal. Arguably, Collingwood went too far in the other 
direction, in advocating too strong a form of historicism, but I think he was right to see the 
identification of presuppositions as an important aim of philosophy, and one which requires 
history of philosophy in its pursuit. 
Logicism provides a good example. In denying that mathematics is reducible to 
logic, Kant presupposed that logic was Aristotelian logic (and was right in his denial). In 
arguing that arithmetic can be reduced to logic, Frege had to expand the domain of logic, 
and today it is often presupposed that logic means Fregean logic (or some extension of it). 
Resolving debates about logicism, then, cannot proceed without clarification of what is 
meant by ‘logic’, in other words, without identification of the relevant presuppositions.90 
Another example is the distinction between psychological genesis and logical justification, 
which might be seen as one of the most fundamental presuppositions of analytic 
philosophy, from which its ahistoricism follows. Once we recognize this presupposition 
and understand its historical source, however, we see that it is shared with neo-Kantianism 
                                                
89 Cf. Floyd’s discussion in her chapter in this Handbook of the ‘interpretive need’ that is left behind by every 
analysis or rigorization. Satisfying this interpretive need will also have an historical dimension. 
90 For discussion of the issues here, see MacFarlane 2002. 
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and British idealism, and hence that ahistoricism is not an inevitable consequence. It may 
have been questioned only relatively recently in the analytic tradition; but history of 
philosophy reveals alternative views of the relationship between philosophy and history of 
philosophy that are much healthier. 
Ahistoricism is undermined, thirdly, when we appreciate how much of actual 
philosophical discourse involves engagement with the ideas of past philosophers. 
Philosophy is essentially ‘talking with a tradition’, to use Brandom’s words.91 This can be 
obscured by the scientism that inhabits some regions of analytic philosophy. This is 
reflected, for example, in views of philosophical research based on scientific models: to 
work at the ‘cutting-edge’ of the discipline involves reading the very latest articles 
published in, say, Mind or Analysis, and coming up with criticisms, counterexamples, 
further arguments, or alternative theories in response. To read only the very latest articles, 
however, is not to philosophize in some purified atmosphere: one cannot breathe in an 
ahistorical vacuum. The past is simply telescoped into a shorter time-frame; and once 
debate develops, the time-frame inevitably expands to reveal its historical roots and 
engagement with tradition becomes more and more explicit.92 
Finally, bringing these last two points together, philosophizing always reflects, 
invokes, or presupposes some kind of underlying narrative, whether grand or modest, 
which reveals location in the historical space of philosophical traditions. This narrative 
may be explicitly articulated in the main text of publications, but more often than not is 
implicitly exhibited in what Derrida (1972) called the ‘margins’ of philosophy – in 
                                                
91 The phrase forms the title of Part One of Brandom 2002. On Brandom’s inferentialist reworking of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, grasp of conceptual content itself is understood as “the ability to navigate and 
negotiate between the different perspectives from which such a content can be interpreted (implicitly) or 
specified (explicitly)” (2002, p. 109). Conversing with tradition is thus constitutive of understanding 
meaning. Brandom’s view is also influenced by Sellars’ conception of history of philosophy as the lingua 
franca of philosophy; Sellars 1973; cf. Floyd 2009, p. 167. 
92 In discussing the relationship between analytic philosophy and history of philosophy in correspondence 
with Isaiah Berlin, Morton White remarks: “Curiously enough, if one treats a contemporary writer one is 
thought to be original, whereas if one treats a far greater figure of the past, one is thought to be derivative or 
parasitical, or what have you. Nonsense, I say.” He goes on to suggest how an historical work can be 
transformed into a ‘pure’, ‘original’ one: “One writes the first, with references to other people, pages, 
chapters, verses, expounding them and criticizing them; then one goes over the manuscript, carefully 
eliminating all the inverted commas and references, and starts talking about the theory of the ghost-in-the-
machine or category mistakes or traditional dualism, etc., etc. Immediately one ceases to be Byzantine and 
becomes Greek, thereby becoming original and unparasitical. Nonsense, I say” (1999, p. 248). 
 The historiography of analytic philosophy 37 
prefaces, footnotes, correspondence, off-the-cuff remarks, gossip, and so on. It is imbibed 
in learning to philosophize in a certain way, and is in turn transmitted through teaching and 
discussion. It may be publicly defended, but will typically be taken for granted in the 
culture or context in which the philosophizing occurs, and may function at subconscious 
levels. We are thrown into a particular philosophical life-world, in other words, and history 
of philosophy is required to appreciate our philosophical Dasein and hence to transcend 
our historical embodiment. 
The narratives that form our philosophical self-identity may well involve distorted 
views of the past, myths, misinterpretations, and so on. These ‘shadow histories’, as 
Watson (1993) called them, may be even more important than real histories.93 Dummett 
saw Frege as rebelling against German idealism, for example,94 while Russell is all too 
readily assumed to have slain Bradley.95 Carnap’s infamous attack on Heidegger’s 
supposed ‘pseudo-statement’ that ‘The Nothing itself nothings’ (‘Das Nichts selbst 
nichtet’) has become a classic of uncharitable interpretation,96 and the literature on 
Wittgenstein is full of exotic characters, from Russellstein to Kripkenstein and now New 
Wittgenstein (or various New Wittgensteins).97 Myths are contagious, however, and sooner 
or later these shadow histories require correction. If analytic philosophers prize truth, 
clarity, and rigour, and wish to divest themselves of the “local and temperamental bias” of 
which Russell spoke (see section 2.3 above), then they should extend their analytic methods 
to investigating and correcting their own narratives and self-identities. 
All four points suggest ways in which philosophy has an intrinsically historical 
dimension and in which history of philosophy is essential to philosophy. History of 
philosophy plays a crucial role in clarifying concepts, doctrines, positions, and problems; 
it identifies presuppositions and opens up alternative views; it makes us appreciate the 
tradition in which our conversations take place; and it develops self-consciousness and 
corrects shadow histories. Analytic philosophy has become the tradition in which much 
                                                
93 For discussion and critique of one such shadow history, see Crawford’s chapter in this Handbook. 
94 See e.g. Dummett 1973, pp. 197-8, 541, 683-4. 
95 For critique of this assumption, see Candlish 2007. 
96 Carnap 1932a, §5. Carnap’s attack is discussed by Friedman in A Parting of the Ways (2000); cf. Friedman 
1996; Inwood 1999; Gabriel 2003; Witherspoon 2003. 
97 See Russell 1922; Kripke 1982; Crary and Read 2000; Read and Lavery 2011. On readings of Wittgenstein, 
see the chapters by Kremer, Glock, and Diamond in this Handbook. 
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philosophizing is now pursued, so that talking with the analytic tradition may form one’s 
first conversations. In this context, it is inevitable that history of analytic philosophy should 
have emerged. History of analytic philosophy is analytic philosophy come to self-
consciousness; it provides the forum for richer dialogues with the past, combining in 
multifarious ways monumental, antiquarian, and critical history, rational and historical 
reconstruction. This has also expanded the repertoire of methods of analysis on which 
philosophers can draw, through various forms of historical and textual analysis – 
genealogical analysis, presuppositional analysis, hermeneutics, deconstructional analysis, 
among others. Analysis itself has been deepened and broadened, synthesizing, we might 
say, logical/conceptual and historical/textual modes of analysis. 
The spread of analytic philosophy across the world, and its ramification into all 
subfields of philosophy and into interdisciplinary projects, is also cultivating new dialogues 
with other traditions and disciplines, which will in turn transform them all, reconfiguring 
their conceptual and historical interconnections. This will require new analyses, 
interrogations, and narratives that renegotiate the positioning and oppositioning involved 
in those traditions and disciplines, in the ways we have seen exemplified in the account 
given here of the construction of the analytic tradition. The future for history of analytic 
philosophy – and for augmented and invigorated analytic philosophy – promises new 
enlightenment. Explicare aude! Have courage to offer your own (historically informed) 
analyses! 
 
